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Abstract—Deep Neural Network (DNN) workloads are quickly
moving from datacenters onto edge devices, for latency, privacy,
or energy reasons. While datacenter networks can be protected
using conventional cybersecurity measures, edge neural networks
bring a host of new security challenges. Unlike classic IoT
applications, edge neural networks are typically very compute
and memory intensive, their execution is data-independent, and
they are robust to noise and faults. Neural network models
may be very expensive to develop, and can potentially re-
veal information about the private data they were trained on,
requiring special care in distribution. The hidden states and
outputs of the network can also be used in reconstructing
user inputs, potentially violating users’ privacy. Furthermore,
neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which may
cause misclassifications and violate the integrity of the output.
These properties add challenges when securing edge-deployed
DNNs, requiring new considerations, threat models, priorities,
and approaches in securely and privately deploying DNNs to the
edge. In this work, we cover the landscape of attacks on, and
defenses, of neural networks deployed in edge devices and provide
a taxonomy of attacks and defenses targeting edge DNNs.
Index Terms—Neural networks, edge deployment, security,
internet of things, model-stealing, watermarking, side-channel,
invasive attack, semi-invasive attack, adversarial attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the rise of deep learning in the last decade, many
different libraries and frameworks for running and training
deep neural networks (DNN) have been published and open-
sourced. In that time, the landscape of software tools for
training neural networks has moved from difficult-to-install
libraries [1], and support for static graphs only [2], to industry-
ready, easy-to-deploy frameworks [3], high-development ef-
ficiency [4], and support for dynamic graphs and just-in-
time compilation [5]. Recently, as tools have gained maturity,
more businesses have started using neural networks in pro-
duction and exposing services based on neural networks [6].
Deploying neural networks is non-trivial, and the research
frameworks proved insufficient to handle high-bandwidth, low-
latency inference, leading to the development of production-
ready frameworks such as Tensorflow Serving [7] and the
standardization of neural network formats with ONNX [8].
With an increasing number of mobile devices and PCs possess-
ing GPUs and custom ASICs, networks have been pushed to
smartphones [9] and even GPU-enabled JavaScript [10]. With
the rise of voice assistants, wearables, and smart cameras, the
need for low-power inference has led to the development of
many custom DNN acceleration ASICs [11], [12].
There are many reasons why businesses or users may want
to run neural networks on edge devices, as an alternative to
sending the data to datacenters for processing, including:
Privacy: users may not want or may not be able to send the
data to the cloud for privacy or legal reasons. For example,
a hospital may want to process patient data on servers at a
different location, but is not willing to risk patient privacy.
Even if the patient data is encrypted, if the server is malicious,
the patient data may be at risk.
Power: sending data directly to the cloud may not be the
most power-efficient approach to run neural networks. For
example, in [13], the authors show that in convolutional neural
networks (CNN), processing a few of the first convolutional
layers before sending the data to the cloud achieves higher
power savings compared to processing the whole network on
the device or sending the input data to the cloud. As more low-
power accelerators using approaches such as quantization [14],
stochastic computing [15], or sparsity [16], [17] are released,
we expect the ratio between the cost of processing networks
and the cost of transmitting input data to become more
significant.
Latency: many applications have hard latency requirements
and must process a network within a certain time limit.
Furthermore, for certain mission-critical applications with hard
availability guarantees, as in the case of autonomous drones
or self-driving cars, being able to process data on the device
is mandatory. While datacenters are able to provide virtually
unlimited computing power, possibly making inference time
negligible, the transmit time of inputs over the network often
cannot be ignored. Hence, a device must possess the required
compute power to process the inputs within the time budget.
Throughput: several industries dealing with high bandwidth
data are faced with the question of whether to store data
for offline processing, allowing thorough analysis at the cost
of large amounts of storage, or to process the data in-flight
potentially sacrificing some information, but saving on storage.
Take an extreme case: the CERN Large Hadron Collider
(LHC) can generate upwards of hundreds of terabytes of data
per second. Storing that data is difficult, so authors of [18]
propose to process the data in-flight using extremely low-
latency FPGA designs.
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II. TAXONOMY OF ATTACKS ON AND DEFENSES OF
DEPLOYED NEURAL NETWORKS
Since DNN accelerators have only recently been deployed
in commercial products, the field of attacking and defending
these devices is in its infancy. In this section we aim to provide
(1) a taxonomy of DNN accelerator attacks and defenses, and
(2) a list of plausible attack surfaces and attacker motivations
for targeting edge devices running DNNs.
A. Taxonomy of DNN Accelerator Attacks and Defenses
Of the many possible dimensions over which we could
characterize attacks and defenses of edge devices, we believe
that the attacker agenda and level of access to the edge
device provide a useful classification. The attacker agenda
represents the goal of the attacker, and ranges from local
denial-of-service (DoS) to gaining full access to a network
of edge devices. Level of access is a set of attack surfaces the
attacker has access to and ranges from simple API accesses to
probing buses or even chip internals. In Figure 1, we present
an overview of attacks, defenses, and potential vulnerabilities
present in the literature.
B. Attacker Agenda
The y-axis in Figure 1 represents the attacker’s motivation
for attacking an edge-deployed neural network. We classify
attacker motivations into four categories:
Denial of Service: attackers may want to prevent a de-
vice running a neural network from properly functioning.
For example, attackers may want to prevent smart cameras
from properly classifying recordings in order not to raise
alarms. Denial of Service (DoS) attacks prevent a device
from maintaining availability and completing its function.
As feedforward neural networks are data-independent and
have fixed latencies, DoS attacks targeting DNNs are only
applicable to accelerators running data-dependent models, e.g.,
recurrent neural networks [19] or neural networks with early
exits like BranchyNets [20] or Tree LSTMs [21].
User Privacy Violation: smart devices are increasingly
trusted with private user data such as shopping history, voice
commands, or medical recordings [22]. This data is valuable
for its advertising, monitoring, or polling value. User privacy
violations are cases where the attacker is able to access
measured or stored sensor data from the device or user
data the device from the network. For example, attacks on
voice assistants where the attacker can access previous voice
commands constitute a local privacy violation.
Model Privacy Violation: the attacker may attempt to
exfiltrate a neural network model for a number of reasons:
(1) models require significant investment to develop, and, as
such, may be stolen and sold, or used in ensembles as a
black box [23], (2) finding adversarial examples is significantly
easier if the attacker has access to a model (i.e., the white-box
scenario), compared to only having access to model inputs and
outputs (i.e., the black-box scenario) [24], or (3) the attacker
may attempt to learn data from the dataset the model was
trained on [25].
Integrity Violation: the attackers may not want to outright
prevent the device from functioning, but may want to force
the neural network to perform in an unacceptable way. For
example, malware may craft adversarial packets in an attempt
to fool a network intrusion detection system (IDS) that uses
DNNs to identify packets. Local integrity violations are cases
where the attacker is able to affect the correctness of a device’s
neural network inference.
In Figure 1, we list several attacker agendas, sorted by
severity. We add two additional categories of general user
and integrity violations, which consists of cases that affect not
only a single device, but multiple devices, some of which are
not under the attacker’s physical control. An example of this
is data poisoning attacks on federated learning systems [26],
where attackers controlling one device can insert backdoors
into all devices in the network.
C. Attacker’s Level of Access
The x-axis in Figure 1 represents the attacker’s level of
access to an edge device. The five access categories vary
by invasiveness from purely software, API-based attacks and
defenses, all the way to invasive attacks, such as decapsulation
and microprobing. The API attacks assume that the attacker
only has access to the device through conventional channels,
e.g. through the network (as in the case of machine translation
systems) or the device’s sensors (as in the case of voice
assistants). Software side-channels additionally assume that
the attacker has some ability to measure side-channels through
the device’s legitimate outputs, e.g., measure the latency of
network responses or the amount of traffic the device is
sending to the cloud. For both API and software side-channel
attacks, the attacker does not need physical contact with the
device. Additionally, these attacks are typically simple to
automate, unlike the attacks based on physical properties of
the device. In the case of physical side-channels, the attacker
needs physical proximity to the device, as in the case of power
or electromagnetic (EM) analysis. However, physical side-
channel attacks do not require invasive sensors or access to
the printed circuit board (PCB). PCB probing attacks include
attacks that may measure data or timing information of any bus
exposed on the PCB, but not the internals of any chip on the
device. These attacks include probing RAM or non-volatile
memory (NVM), as well as cold-boot attacks, etc. Finally,
invasive attacks access the internals of a chip. These include
approaches such as decapsulation (a procedure where the chip
packaging is removed), microprobing (where the attacker can
probe the internals of a chip), chemical attacks that can reveal
information stored in read-only memory, and scanning electron
microscope (SEM) attacks (which are able to read RAM
memory) [27]. These attacks typically require specialized labs
and expensive equipment. They are often destructive and
may require multiple devices before a successful attack is
implemented. For completeness, we also include training-time
attacks and defenses that happen before devices are deployed,
or during on-line training. Attacks that take place strictly
before deployment are beyond the scope of this study.
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Fig. 1. Taxonomy of attacks, defenses, and potential vulnerabilities of edge devices running ML inference or on-line training.
III. ATTACKS ON DEPLOYED NEURAL NETWORKS
We present a short survey of published attacks on neural
network accelerators. We focus primarily on test-time at-
tacks (attacks on already trained models), as we assume that
training-time attacks such as data poisoning [28] or Neural
Trojans [29] must happen before the model is deployed.
API attacks: API attacks interact with the victim device only
through the sensors, the interface, or the network. Here we
assume that the attack is independent of the hardware platform
running the neural network and does not rely on any side-
channel information. The majority of the API attacks present
in the literature either attempt to (1) exfiltrate the model or
the model metaparameters, (2) find adversarial examples, or
(3) infer some property of the model’s training data.
In [30], the authors show how machine learning models
hosted behind APIs can be exfiltrated. Here the attacker
sends crafted inputs and collects outputs from the model
until the attacker is able to reconstruct the model behind the
API. In the case of simpler ML models such as decision
trees, the models can be perfectly reconstructed. However, for
more complex models such as neural networks, the attacker
cannot simply solve nonlinear equations to arrive at model
weights, but must instead train a ‘student’ network on input-
output pairs collected from the API [31]. A similar work [32]
shows the simplicity of reverse-engineering black-box neural
network weights, architecture, optimization method and the
training/data split. In [33], authors reframe the goal from
model theft, to arriving at a ‘knockoff’ model exhibiting the
same functionality. In [34], authors ignore model parameters
and instead attempt to steal the hyperparameters of a network.
Good hyperparameters, while far smaller than models, can be
more difficult to arrive at, as they require many experiments
and human effort to tune.
In order to violate the integrity of a machine learning model,
attackers may attempt to find adversarial examples [35]. While
most attacks rely on having access to the white-box model
or the output gradient, several works have shown that even
black-box networks [32] and networks with obfuscated gradi-
ents [36] are not resistant to determined attackers.
Lastly, attackers may attempt to infer some information
about the data the neural network was trained on. Attacks
which determine whether a specific input was used in training
a model are called membership inference attacks. Though
DNN models are typically smaller than the training dataset,
they can nonetheless memorize potentially secret informa-
tion [25], as in the example of predictive keyboards memoriz-
ing PIN codes or passwords. In [37], authors show that even
when the model is behind a black-box API, and the adversary
has no knowledge of the victim’s training dataset, membership
inference attacks are still successful.
Software side-channel attacks: API and software side-
channel (SC) attacks target a similar attack surface, but soft-
ware side-channel attacks can additionally gain information
through side-effects such as timing or cache side-channels.
Here, the attacker abuses information about the physical device
processing the attackers request to gain an insight into the
internal state of the device.
Both timing and cache side-channels typically cannot reveal
anything about the data being processed on the device -
timing SC reveal information about the compute intensity of
a certain task, and cache SC reveal information about recently
accessed addresses in the caches. As such, they are commonly
employed to extract course-grain information such as neural
network architecture running on a device. For example, in
Cache Telepathy [38], attackers use the Flush+Reload [39]
and Prime+Probe [40] cache SC attacks to measure the size of
general matrix multiply (GEMM) operations, first counting the
number of parameters in the model, and then narrowing down
the model architecture. While this attack is restricted to CPUs,
GPUs are no less vulnerable to cache-side channels [41]. A
similar work [42] is applicable to CPUs, GPUs, and DNN
accelerators, and can fingerprint a network after only a single
inference operation. It leverages a priori knowledge of major
DNN libraries to prime the instruction cache and learn which
functions are called during inference.
Timing attacks are also used to reveal model architecture:
in [43], the authors assume that the attacker knows the victim’s
hardware, and is able to buy the same device in order to build
timing profiles of different networks. By only knowing the
accuracy and the latency of the victim network, the attacker
trains many candidate architectures searching for one that has
the same signature. This, however, requires the attacker to
first steal a part of the training dataset using a membership
inference attack [37], which negates much of the need for
stealing a model architecture.
Software SC attacks may be less successful in the edge
domain compared to the cloud, as edge devices typically serve
a single user, while SC are typically used for compromising
secure multi-user systems [44]. However, as more networks
are pushed to the edge, we can expect multi-network systems
with different privileges, goals, and timescales to become
increasingly common. An example of this may be predictive
keyboards, which perform both inference (text prediction) and
NN training on the same device [45].
Another potential vulnerability may be introduced with the
adoption of data-dependent inference latency. For example,
DARPA’s N-ZERO program [46] seeks low-power edge de-
vices that may need to stay dormant for years and have several
levels of neural networks, each activating the next one once a
certain pattern is sensed. These types of networks are inher-
ently vulnerable to timing attacks, as conventional methods
for defending against timing attacks, such as constant time
functions negate all the benefits of variable-latency inference.
Physical side-channel attacks: Physical side-channels typi-
cally measure some physical quantity, such as power, electro-
magnetic radiation, vibration, etc. Several works have explored
using physical side-channels to extract the neural network
architecture, weights, or user inputs to an edge device.
Memory access patterns can trivially reveal model architec-
ture. In [47], authors attempt to steal a model and model archi-
tecture running on a secure enclave such as Intel SGX [48], by
observing memory access traces. While traces allow attackers
to learn the architecture, the model can only be stolen if the
accelerator exploits data-dependent model properties, such as
the sparsity of hidden neuron activations [49]. Power and elec-
tromagnetic (EM) side-channel attacks are explored in [50],
where the authors use EM SCs to learn the activation function,
simple power analysis to learn model architecture, and differ-
ential power analysis to learn network weights. While simple
power analysis does not require invasive measures, differential
power analysis may require chip decapsulation, and would
need to be classified as an invasive attack. Finally, the authors
show how user’s private inputs may be extracted using power
analysis. A similar attack is explored in [51], where the authors
use a power side-channel to observe the processing of the first
layer of a convolutional network and extract user’s inputs. The
authors explore both active and passive attackers, i.e., attackers
that can actively input their own images to the accelerator
and attackers that can only observe user inputs. Another
line of attacks attempts to induce faults in order to cause
misclasifications [52], [53] and relies on a microarchitectural
or device-level attacks, such as RowHammer [54].
Probing attacks: Probing attacks assume that an attacker
is able to access the individual components of the device,
e.g., the CPU/GPU/ASIC, the RAM memory, non-volatile
storage, or busses, but is not able to perform invasive attacks
that access the internals of the chips. The attacker has full
access to measure signals on any exposed wires or even drive
wires themself. This opens up a variety of denial-of-service,
integrity, and privacy attacks. Additionally, probing attacks
assume that no tamper evidence is left after the attack, unlike
invasive attacks.
A simple attack the attacker can carry out is model theft -
here the attacker probes the memory bus and runs an inference
operation while recording the model being loaded onto the
chip. This can be prevented by storing only the encrypted
model in RAM and NVM, and decrypting the model on-
the-fly, if power requirements permit [23]. However, even
if the model is encrypted, just knowing the memory access
pattern is enough to reveal the model architecture. Each layer
and activation will have a different memory bandwidth, and
the attacker can monitor these changes along with memory
addresses to learn where layers start and end in memory. While
oblivious RAM [55] can hide memory addresses, memory
access timings are still sufficient to reveal the topology of
the model. This forces the defender to either prefetch weights
or create fake accesses in order to obfuscate memory access
timings [23]. Similarly, network activations may be larger than
the available on-chip memory and may be stored in RAM.
These activations also need to be encrypted, because even in
cases when the device manufacturer is not concerned about
privacy, these activations can be used in order to infer the
model weights [56].
The attacker may also attempt to overwrite parts of RAM
or feed their own inputs to the chip in order to subvert any
software guards, for example in order to generate more input-
output pairs used for API model theft [30]. Encrypted RAM
may defend against this type of attack, but the device is still
susceptible to DoS attacks, where fake accesses are inserted
on busses.
Invasive attacks: Invasive attacks assume that the attacker has
full control over the chip and is able to bypass any tamper-
proof packaging. These attacks include freezing the device
in order to extract volatile memory, probing the internals of
the chip, ionizing parts of the chip in order to induce faults,
feeding non-legitimate voltages and clock frequencies to the
chip, etc. Mounting these attacks is typically cost-prohibitive
and requires substantial expertise and equipment to execute.
Several works have explored invasive attacks on DNN
accelerators, and many of the conventional (non-DNN specific)
invasive attacks are still applicable to them. In DeepLaser [57],
the authors decapsulate a chip and are able to induce faults by
shining a laser on the chip, causing misclasifications by the
neural network. This is done by causing bit-flips in the last
layer’s activation function, where flipping high-order bits of an
output neuron’s activation will cause the associated category
or value to be dominant. Choosing the minimal amount of
bit-flips to achieve a desired output has been studied in two
works: [52] and [53]. Both these works show that, despite
the robustness of neural networks to random perturbations,
networks are highly susceptible to targeted bit-flips, in a
manner similar to non-targeted adversarial attacks [58].
While we have not been able to find any examples of this,
we expect neural network accelerators to be vulnerable to cold
boot attacks [59], which may be able to steal unencrypted
models stored in volatile memory, or microprobing [27], which
may be able to bypass model or user data decryption.
IV. DEFENDING EDGE DEVICES RUNNING NEURAL
NETWORKS
We briefly cover proposed defenses for edge devices running
neural networks.
API defenses: The majority of API attacks we have mentioned
attempt to steal the model or the model architecture, learn
which inputs have been used to train the model, or find
adversarial examples for the model running on the device. As
finding adversarial examples typically involves first stealing
the model [32], we focus only on defenses against model
exfiltration and membership inference attacks.
In a recent work called Prada [60], the authors succeed in
detecting API model-stealing attacks with a 100% detection
rate and no false positives. Here, the authors do not attempt
to detect if a single query is malicious (as in the case of
adversarial attacks), but whether some consecutive set of them
is actively trying to steal the model. The authors detect model-
stealing queries as they are specifically crafted to extract the
maximum amount of information out of the model. However,
the authors note that attackers may introduce dummy queries
to maintain a benign query distribution, resulting in slower but
more covert model-stealing attacks.
Watermarking is a method for embedding secret information
into some system in order to verify the origin of that system
at a later date. Watermarking has been proposed as a method
of establishing ownership of neural networks [61]–[63]. Here,
a watermark is applied to a neural network in such a way
that it does not impact the network’s accuracy, but can be
used to confirm ownership from network outputs. Even if the
party responsible for the theft attempts to prune or finetune
the network, watermarks can be retained [62].
Defending against membership inference attacks has been
explored in several works. In [64], the authors claim that
overfitting is the reason why models are vulnerable to mem-
bership inference attacks and suggest that differential pri-
vacy [65] used during training can protect against these types
of attacks. They propose several defenses, similar to those
used in defending against adversarial attacks: (1) reducing
the number of predicted classes (in the case of classification
problems), (2) reducing the amount of information per class by
rounding prediction probabilities, (3) increasing entropy of the
prediction values and (4) using stronger regularization during
training. Similarly, in [37], the authors propose two defenses:
dropout [66], where authors show that randomly zeroing out
neurons during training partially prevents the attackers from
inferring membership, and model stacking, where multiple
models are used in an ensemble to make a prediction.
Side-channel defenses: Due to the data-independent behavior
of non-recurrent DNNs, all of the software side-channel at-
tacks we have listed attempt to steal the network architecture.
We have not been able to find any attacks that succeed
at violating privacy of the inputs or the model parameters
through software side-channels. In DeepRecon [42], where
attackers prime the instruction cache in order to learn function
invocations, the authors propose a defense where the defender
simultaneously creates decoy function calls to similar neural
network layers. These decoy layers should be small enough not
to incur a performance penalty. However, this defense does not
stop the attacker from using data cache-based side-channels
or timing side-channels. Cache Telepathy [38] suggests less
aggressive compiler optimizations, cache partitioning [67] or
disallowing resource sharing as defenses against cache-based
SC. However, these may not be viable solutions without
hardware support for secure caches.
While cache-based defenses may help hide some of the
accesses, and the defender may go so far as to remove the
possibility of an attacker executing code on the same shared
resources as the victim, a determined attacker may attempt
to probe the memory bus. As neural networks are typically
larger than the last-level cache of modern processors, caches
will suffer from capacity misses and the network architecture
may be exposed to memory probing attacks. In the Trusted
Inference Engine (TIE) [23], the device can either create fake
memory accesses in times of reduced memory bandwidth or
prefetch data, given available on-chip storage. As TIE targets
networks with data-independent profiles (i.e., not recurrent
neural networks), the timing of fake or prefetched accesses
can be calculated at compile time.
Similar techniques can be applied to counter power and tim-
ing side-channels. As long as networks have data-independent
behavior, i.e., the accelerator does not attempt to take advan-
tage of zero values [49], or the network computation graph is
static [20], [68], power and timing side-channel attacks should
not be able to learn information about the network.
Defenses against invasive and semi-invasive attacks: There
are two common approaches used when an organization needs
to deploy software with privacy or integrity requirements.
One option is to not trust the edge hardware, and assume
that the hardware can be actively malicious, as in the case
of untrusted CPUs/GPUs, possible hardware Trojans, broken
hardware defenses [69], etc. There exist several algorithms
that allow processing on private data. Homomorphic encryp-
tion [70] (HE) for neural networks has been explored in
CryptoNets [71], where the authors use HE to run neural
networks on encrypted data, without decrypting it at any
time during the process. One of the issues with using HE
is the performance reduction - inference using HE can be
100-1000 times slower than without HE. Several works have,
however, been able to accelerate HE for neural networks. In
Gazelle [72], authors leverage HE for linear layers and Yao’s
Garbled Circuits [73] for offloading calculating nonlinearities
to the owner of the private data, as well as an efficient SIMD
implementation and a set of homomorphic linear algebra.
While HE is very efficient for linear layers of a network,
DNNs typically use nonlinear activations between the layers,
requiring many rounds of computationally expensive calcula-
tions. An alternative venue for private inference is based on
Yao’s Garbled Circuits [73] (GC). Here, two parties want to
compute the output of a function (a neural network in this
case), where one party supplies the network, and the other
the inputs to the network. The party that supplies the network
typically creates a garbled circuit and uses a procedure such
as oblivious transfer [74] (OT) to acquire the second party’s
inputs without learning those inputs. A naive implementation
of neural networks on GC is very inefficient, and several
works have presented domain-specific optimizations to them.
In DeepSecure [75], authors first prune the network [76], and
then convert the network to Verilog for which they can apply
logic minimization. In [77], authors present a modified GC that
supports free addition and constant-multiplication on a limited
integer range, and a significantly cheaper activation function.
As a third take on efficient DNNs using GC, XONN [78]
attempts to accelerate XNOR-based networks [79] (networks
where activations have only values of -1 or 1), as XNOR
operations can be processed for free in GC [80]. While GC
requires a linear number of rounds w.r.t. the number of network
layers, both [75] and [78] are able to perform inference in a
fixed amount of rounds.
The question that arises is whether it makes sense to run any
of these algorithms on edge devices. In the case of inference,
where both the model and user inputs should be kept private,
the defender has the choice of sending encrypted inputs to the
cloud or sending the encrypted model to the edge. Since HE is
computationally expensive, edge devices may not receive any
latency benefits by running the models locally (unless they are
not connected to the network at all).
Another option for private edge inference is hardware
root-of-trust [81]. Here, the defender trusts some type of
hardware device, which is built with certain security measures,
as in the case of secure enclaves [48], [82], [83] or secure
accelerators [23]. These devices are typically built to work
in adversarial environments, where the threat model assumes
that attacker can tamper with the device, but cannot probe
chip internals. For example, using secure enclaves, such as
Intel SGX [48], to perform inference can provide privacy
and integrity to the user and neural network deployer, but
may be very inefficient. In MLCapsule [84], authors develop
a machine learning as a service (MLaaS) platform above
Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) such as Intel SGX, and
formally prove it’s security. In [85], the authors propose to use
Intel SGX as a hardware root-of-trust, but leverage other hard-
ware such as more powerful (but untrusted) CPUs cores and
GPUs to perform inference. The authors are able to guarantee
both the privacy of the data sent to untrusted devices, as well as
the integrity of results received. An alternative venue explores
building custom secure neural network accelerators [23]. Here,
the design stores obfuscated or encrypted models in off-chip
memory, and performs efficient decryption / deobfuscation
on the device. The design leverages secure pseudo-random
number generators using physical unclonable functions [86]
(PUF) as a source of randomness as an alternative to the
power-hungry but more secure encryption. The design also
provides security against timing attacks by prefetching data or
creating fake accesses to RAM memory.
Since the attacker can still probe peripherals, the device
must encrypt data in RAM. However, by timing the memory
accesses, the attacker can learn the model architecture. Using
oblivious RAM (ORAM) does not help, as ORAM only
protects the address values and not access times. Additionally,
neural network weights are typically stored in ascending order,
so knowing the addresses (but not timings) reveals only the
complete model size. To prevent the attacker from timing the
RAM, the defender, then, must either have a prefetcher and
load weights in advance while maintaining a constant band-
width, or create fake accesses in times when the bandwidth is
unused [23], [87].
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have presented a survey of attacks and
defenses on neural networks. We have created a taxonomy of
attacks and defenses with regard to attackers level of access
to the hardware, and attacker’s agenda. We have described
different types of attacks on neural networks, ranging from
API-based attacks to invasive attacks such as decapsulation
and microprobing. Finally, we gave an overview of the types
of defenses of neural networks, with the goal of protecting the
privacy of user data, the privacy of deployed neural networks,
or the integrity of neural network inference.
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